Palogic Value Fund, LP and Palogic Value Management, LP (collectively, “Palogic” “we” or “our”) issued the following letter on August 18, 2026, to the Board of Trustees (the “Board”) of Granite Point Mortgage Trust Inc. (“Granite Point” or the “Company”) (NYSE: GPMT).

August 18, 2026

Granite Point Mortgage Trust

c/o Corporate Secretary

1114 Avenue of the Americas, Suite 3020

New York, New York 10036

Dear Members of the Board:

Palogic Value Fund, LP owns over a million shares of Granite Point Mortgage Trust and has followed the Company for several years. Over the past five years, the Company’s GAAP book value has declined from $17.27/share at June 30, 2021 to a value of $5.70/share at June 30, 2026. The Company’s stock price declined approximately 89.8% over the same period.

While we are encouraged by the recent upsizing of an existing repurchase facility to resolve the two legacy CRE CLOs and the resolution of select loans, we are concerned that the company retains little of its franchise value. At the Friday, August 14 closing price of $1.19, which approximates 21% of reported book value, we believe that public shareholders agree with our skepticism.

We Question the Company’s Strategy and Cost Structure

We have significant concerns about the continuation of Granite Point’s current strategy for the following reasons:

Absence of a Differentiated Franchise: We believe sustainable franchise value in the commercial mortgage REIT sector requires at least one of three distinct pillars: a specialized and repeatable underwriting niche; proven agility to take advantage of different parts of the CRE capital structure as opportunity sets change; or institutional scale and low-cost sponsor sourcing. The strongest platforms have all three. In our view, Granite Point has very little that differentiates it from its competitors.

Persistent Multi-Property Type Credit Migration: While the market understands the post-pandemic headwinds that have pressured office CRE valuations, Granite Point’s credit deterioration has expanded across multiple CRE property classes. Over the last two years, loans downgraded to the highest level of risk (“5”) also include Hotel, Mixed-Use, and Multifamily CRE. In our opinion, this ongoing migration potentially reflects broader underwriting deficiencies across property types, submarkets, and sponsors rather than an isolated, sector-specific shock. We note that the Company’s Q2 2026 Earnings Supplement reflects specific CECL reserves of 47.4% across the five risk-rated “5” loans – a significant level of credit impairment that continues to depress book value.

Lack of Profitability/Declining Margins: Since June 30, 2021, total assets have contracted from roughly $3.9 billion to the current level of $1.4 billion at the end of the second quarter. Net interest income has fallen from $22.7 million to a recent low of $4.7 million over the same period. Without non-interest revenue, the Company’s declining earnings profile cannot support its current overhead in our view.

Excessive Cost Structure: We believe that, without institutional support to help manage the cost base, unaffiliated shareholders are left with a corporate cost base that is too high relative to the current asset base. For the quarter ending June 30, 2021, the Company reported compensation and benefits of $5 million against an asset base of roughly $3.9 billion. At the end of the second quarter of 2026, reported compensation and benefits were $4.3 million against an asset base of $1.4 billion. This annualized cost base is now 1.3% of assets versus .51% in 2021. Why has the Board not taken steps to systematically reduce the cost structure of the company?

We Believe Granite Point Should Pursue a Variety of Steps to Preserve Value

We believe that Granite Point’s Board and management team should focus on capital preservation, balance sheet de-risking, and realization and distribution of book value to shareholders. Specifically, we encourage the following initiatives.

Expedite Legacy Asset Resolution: In our opinion, management should expeditiously seek to accelerate loan payoffs, continue to pursue loan participation sales like the Dallas office building execution in Q2, and proactively pursue whole loan sales either on an individual or portfolio basis.

Servicing and Corporate Cost Reduction: We believe the company should work with outside parties that have servicing infrastructure capabilities as a more cost-effective means to sub-service the existing loan book. Further, we ask the Board and management to aggressively rein in corporate costs to align the executive and G&A structure with the reality of a subscale loan book.

Cease New Loan Origination Efforts: In our view, the company should refrain from adding additional loan exposure through new originations. With approximately 25% of the existing loan book still carrying stressed risk weightings (4 or 5) and several loans remaining on non-accrual1, we believe raising highly dilutive equity or keeping leverage elevated seems to be the most likely funding path for new originations. We believe neither approach is prudent. Instead, we ask the Board to continue to allocate net proceeds from portfolio run-off and resolutions toward debt retirement.

We hope the Board will act without delay to challenge the status quo, accelerate realizations, and return significant value to shareholders. We look forward to a constructive engagement with you to those ends.

Respectfully,

Ryan Vardeman, Principal

Scott Williams, Principal

Palogic Value Management, LP

About Palogic

Palogic Value Management, LP, is an investment advisor founded in 2006 that seeks to achieve long-term capital appreciation while limiting the risk of permanent capital impairment by investing in securities the principals believe are trading at a significant discount to intrinsic value, often due to industry dislocation or market misperception of a company’s prospects.

___________________________

1

  

Source: Q2 2026 Earnings Supplement

 

Media gallery

About The Author
Business Wire